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CONVICTION BEYOND A REASONABLE SUSPICION? THE NEED
FOR STRENGTHENING THE FACTUAL BASIS REQUIREMENT IN
GUILTY PLEAS
Myeonki Kim*
Does the court, before accepting a guilty plea, check the accuracy of
the plea agreement in any significant way? This article addresses the issues
on judges being unconcerned or the inconsistent practice of guiding the
stages of guilty plea. The article further suggests that the judge should
carefully review its factual basis to avoid a wrongful guilty plea. Although
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure requires the judges to
check the factual basis of the guilty plea, the rule is not paid much attention
to legal professionals. Setting the adversarial culture aside, the rule itself has
a structural problem not to be enforced properly during a plea colloquy.
Instead of revising the rule, this article proposes a newer interpretation to
induce judges more responsible to confirm the factual basis. This could be a
practical solution 1) to filter out an inaccurate pleading guilty, 2) to increase
the accountability of the prosecution in guilty plea, and 3) to help the
defendant make more informed plea decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
The dominance of plea bargaining is apparent in the American
criminal justice system.1 Most cases are disposed of by guilty pleas, and trials
are rarely held. Although plea bargaining has existed for a long time, there
has been a rapid increase of guilty-plea cases recently.2 As jury trials have
become increasingly complex and time-consuming in the twentieth century,
the prosecution and the defense have shown more preference towards
expeditious, predictable plea bargaining. 3 Harsh sentencing rubrics, which
arose from “tough on crime” policies, also facilitated this movement.4 Even
though there are conflicting views as to how to see and recognize the pleabargaining process, plea bargaining is generally regarded as an essential
element to reduce crowded dockets.5
If plea bargaining contributes to the search for truth or administering
justice, the high ratio itself is not a problem. However, there is a growing
disbelief in the accuracy of guilty pleas.6 Although many assume a defendant
to be an informed decision-maker in a guilty plea,7 the credibility of guilty
pleas is becoming questionable. 8 In fact, numerous exonerations have
revealed that a large number of people are pleading guilty to crimes they did
not commit.9 In response to these growing concerns, the Supreme Court of
the United States has begun addressing more cases involving plea
bargaining. 10 Although many scholars have also proposed a variety of
reforms in diverse aspects, the impact has been minimal. 11 Additionally,

1

See Part II.A.
See John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 261, 261-70 (1979).
3
See Part II.A.
4
See Part IV.C.
5
See Part IV.B.
6
See Part II.B.
7
Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 79, 80 (2011).
8
See Part II.B.
9
See Part II.B.
10
See Part II.A.
11
See Part II.C.
2
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resources for the defense, which are essential to a guilty-plea process, are still
insufficient.
This Article argues that judges should carefully check the factual
basis of guilty pleas during plea hearings through a reinterpretation of
existing rules.12 More than a half-century ago, the Supreme Court obligated
judges to confirm the factual basis of a plea agreement before accepting it.13
Nevertheless, most judges tend to focus on confirming whether defendants
are voluntarily pleading guilty and waiving their constitutional rights, rather
than confirming the factual basis of the guilty plea. Moreover, there is no
clear agreement among judges on the definition of “factual basis.” 14 The
current system does not work properly because there are structural problems
in the composition of the relevant rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (FRCP).15 If judges more actively interpreted the rules requiring
confirmation, they would be obliged to establish a certain degree of guilt
before accepting a guilty plea. Judges are in the best position to reform the
problematic status quo of the plea-bargaining process, benefiting both the
prosecutor and the accused.16
Given the central role of guilty pleas in the criminal justice system,
the potential resistance to any reform of the plea-bargaining process must be
considered carefully. 17 Judicial inertia, which is deeply rooted in the
American adversarial system, will likely pose the greatest resistance to this
argument. 18 It might be difficult for trial judges, who are already used to
taking on neutral and passive roles, to actively intervene in an agreed-upon
guilty plea. However, this Article contends that, currently, judges do not even
play a minimum role as a neutral arbiter. It should be noted that it is the duty
of the judge to find a factual basis before accepting a guilty plea. This Article
will also refute other concerns regarding the enhanced judicial review for the

12

See Part III.B.
See Part III.A.
14
See Part III.A.
15
See Part III.B.
16
See Part III.C.
17
See Part IV. Because plea bargaining is almost inevitable in disposing criminal cases, small
changes can cause great impact, and ultimately strong resistance. Therefore, this paper
addresses possible resistance in Part IV.
18
See Part IV.A.
13
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factual basis requirement, such as insufficient resources19 and detriment to
defendants.20
Part II analyzes the American plea-bargaining system, particularly
focusing on its questionable practice and the limits of existing suggestions.
Part III argues that the factual basis requirement in Rule 11(e) of the FRCP
should be reinvigorated. Although this provision has been rather unnoticed,
this Article suggests that its reinterpretation would instill a greater sense of
responsibility in judges to find factual basis. Part IV refutes anticipated
objections, because even a slight change in the plea-bargaining practice will
bring a considerable change in the criminal justice system.
I. THE QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF PLEA BARGAINING: BY-PRODUCT OF
ADVERSARIAL EXCESSES
A.

The American Way of Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining now dominates the American criminal justice
system.21 As Justice Kennedy pointed out, the American system “is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,”22 and plea bargaining “is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.” 23 It may be hard for judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to
imagine a criminal procedure without plea bargaining. Scholars have long
been aware of this trend towards plea bargaining: most articles discussing
plea-bargaining issues present evidence that most criminal cases are disposed

19

See Part IV.B.
See Part IV.C.
21
Of course, this did not happen all at once. Professor Wayne R. LaFave explains that many
factors are comprehensibly contributable to plea bargaining’s current status. WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1195 (W. Acad. 6th ed. 2017). According to LaFave,
these factors include an increased number of cases, the emergence of professional law
enforcement agencies and defense counsel, cumbersome and expensive jury trials, the due
process revolution, the harshness of criminal law, unpredictable sentencing practices, and
the desire of prosecutors and judges to get convictions. Id. Put simply, the expansion of plea
bargaining arose from three distinct factors: (1) administrative convenience, (2)
modernization of the criminal justice system, and (3) severe punishments within the current
system. Id.
22
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012). In another case on the same day, Kennedy
also warned that “[t]he reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system . . . it is insufficient simply to point to the
guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012).
23
Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
20
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of through guilty pleas.24 Students assigned to observe jury trials should be
concerned about losing the increasingly rare opportunity to actually observe
such a trial. Professor Marc Galanter’s well-known “vanishing trial” has
already become commonplace in American criminal courts. 25
Although plea bargaining is now widely used, surrounding
controversies still persist. The issue that typically arises is related to
understanding plea bargaining and addressing its existing problems
accordingly. A majority of legal professionals view plea bargaining as no
more than a contract.26 For them, it is merely a different type of adversarial
process, in which parties bargain for a mutually agreed-upon outcome.27 One
of the strong supporters of this assertion, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, argues
that “[p]lea bargaining is a form of contract, and its regulation through the
common-law process is fundamentally no different from the way courts treat
other contracts.” 28 According to Judge Easterbrook, the lessons of
commercial law apply equally to the plea-bargaining practice; thus, proposals
to regulate plea bargaining would inevitably cause side effects.29 Therefore,
he argues that the focus must be not on the system of plea bargaining, but on
the defendants’ inherent disadvantage and how to correct it.30
24

See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179, 1206 (1975) (concerning the fact that Alschuler’s article was written over forty
years ago, which indicates that the dominance of plea bargaining is not a recent event);
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV.
869, 871 (2009).
25
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
26
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 551
(2013); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 23, at 1911–12.
27
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 23, at 1935.
28
See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 551.
29
See id. at 551–52. In his article, Judge Easterbrook states that:
[P]roposals to regulate plea bargaining have the same limitations and
consequences as proposals to regulate commercial contracts. Ban it, and it
continues but goes underground, as in many states before they gradually
recognized its legitimacy during the 1960s and 1970s. Black markets
predominate when lawful markets are forbidden—but black markets are
characterized by less information, more fraud, and few guarantees of
voluntary action. Far better to acknowledge the practice and get the terms
in writing; contract law has a Statute of Frauds for very good reason.
Id.
30
See id. at 553–54.
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Others present different views.31 They point out that the real practice
of plea bargaining contains many non-adversarial features,32 such as Gerard
E. Lynch’s Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice.33 Even if “plea
bargaining grows out of an adversarial ideology,” it is “a system of justice
that actually looks, to most defendants, far more like . . . an inquisitorial
system” than an adversary model.34 The prosecutors’ role in plea bargaining
is closer to an adjudicatory function, because their priority is to make accurate,
appropriate decisions after reviewing evidence; negotiation is rather limited
and subsidiary.35
More than 50 years ago, Professor Herbert L. Packer made a similar
claim through his famous Two Models of The Criminal Process.36 Professor
Packer argued that plea bargaining is largely based on the Crime Control
Model, which “places heavy reliance on the ability of investigative and
prosecutorial officers, acting in an informal setting in which their distinctive
skills are given full sway, to elicit and reconstruct a tolerably accurate account
of . . . an alleged criminal event.” 37 In contrast, he claimed that the Due
Process Model, which rejects “informal fact[-]finding processes as definitive
of factual guilt and [insists] on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact[-]finding
processes . . . [before] an impartial tribunal,” rarely exists in the guilty-plea
process.38
These contrasting views explain why it took so long for the pleabargaining system to become a dominant feature of the American legal
system. Although plea bargaining had already become a common practice in
the United States during the mid-1800s,39 the practice of plea bargaining did
31

See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1673 (2015); Barkow, supra note 24.
32
See Barkow, supra note 24, at 871 (“In the current era dominated by pleas instead of trials,
federal prosecutors are not merely law enforcers. They are the final adjudicators in the vast
majority of cases.” (emphasis added)).
33
Lynch, supra note 31.
34
Lynch, supra note 31, at 1677. An inquisitorial system is “[a] system of proof-taking used
in civil law, whereby the judge conducts the trial, determines what questions to ask, and
defines the scope and the extent of the inquiry.” Inquisitorial System, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 913 (10th ed. 2014).
35
Lynch, supra note 31, at 1683.
36
See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
37
Id. at 14. Packer goes on to say, “any general view of the guilty plea in this country at the
present time would disclose practices that conform far more closely to the Crime Control
than to the Due Process Model.” Id. 50–51.
38
Id. at 14.
39
John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants

108

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

not gain legitimacy in the legal community until long after that.40 It was not
until 1967 that the American Bar Association noted the necessity of plea
bargaining due to resource limitations and thereafter embraced the practice.41
Then, in the 1970s, the Supreme Court first admitted the constitutionality of
plea bargaining42 and officially acknowledged its several advantages, which
the Court thought were essential to the modern criminal justice system.43
However, even after this acknowledgment, the Court has remained
reluctant to intervene in the plea-bargaining practice. For example, the Court
initially refused to accept Ineffective Assistance of Counsel appeals (IAC),
even though there was a lack of clarity about what constitutes IAC in plea
bargaining.44 It was only a few years ago that Padilla v. Kentucky,45 Missouri
v. Frye, 46 and Lafler v. Cooper 47 recognized IAC claims during plea
negotiations.48 In Padilla, the Court required that immigration consequences
of a conviction should be made known to a non-citizen defendant before

Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162 (2014) (citing JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA
BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9 (Hiram E. Chodosh ed., 2009)).
40
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (approving the constitutionality of
plea bargaining); Blume & Helm, supra note 39 (“The constitutionality of the practice . . .
was not firmly established until 1970.”).
41
Blume & Helm, supra note 39 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY
2 (1967)).
42
Brady, 397 U.S. at 753 (“[W]e cannot hold that [plea bargaining] is unconstitutional for
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the
State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in
rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.”).
43
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“‘[P]lea bargaining[]’ is an
essential component of the administration of justice . . . If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply
by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”).
44
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1231 (“There is greater uncertainty as to what
[effective assistance of counsel] means in a guilty plea context as compared to a trial context
. . . .”).
45
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010) (holding that the defendant should hear the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
46
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (noting that a guilty plea is invalid because
counsel “provided incorrect advice pertinent to the plea”).
47
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 176 (2012) (ruling that a state habeas petitioner can argue
ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel deficiently advises him to reject a
favorable plea bargain, even though he is convicted in a fair trial).
48
Thus, it seems that the Court is no longer reluctant to assess the plea-bargaining process
under the IAC rubric.
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entering a guilty plea. 49 Frye and Lafler mandated that counsel’s
communication and advice during plea negotiation should be correct.50 “In
order that benefits [of plea bargaining] can be realized,” the Court
emphasized, “criminal defendants require effective counsel during plea
negotiations.”51
In those cases, the Court emphasized the predominant role of plea
bargaining, which virtually replaced trial, and seemed to signal that this was
the primary reason for justifying its decision to accept IAC claims. 52
However, the criminal justice system had long been governed by plea
bargaining.53 After plea bargaining gained constitutional legitimacy, the last
several decades witnessed only a slight change in its proportion.54 The real
reason for the slow shift of IAC jurisprudence may be the Court’s ongoing
reluctance to “acknowledge either the existence or the legitimacy of plea
negotiations.”55 The great controversy that would be expected to follow after
any plea-bargaining decision could be another reason; both Frye and Lafler
were 5–4 decisions.56 These long-delayed changes show the degree to which
plea bargaining is a controversial and complicated area to regulate.
The above discussion leads to two conclusions. First, plea bargaining
is a sort of by-product inevitably derived from the cumbersome jury trial,
which symbolizes the American legal system. Both sides, whether plea
bargaining is viewed as adversarial or inquisitorial, admit the need for
increased efficiency. 57 Second, the area of plea bargaining has long been
49

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369.
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 168 (“If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to
effective assistance of counsel . . . . If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of
the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in . . . the imposition of . . . more severe
[consequences].”); Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 (“[D]efense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be
favorable to the accused.”).
51
Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.
52
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170; Frye, 566 U.S. at 143; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
53
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1231.
56
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 175–87 (noting that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Alito joined
in the dissent); Frye, 566 U.S. at 151 (noting that Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts
joined in the dissent).
57
See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 552 (“Prosecutors have limited budgets and want to
induce guilty pleas so that they can bring more cases, using the resources released when they
don't have to take each defendant to trial.”); Lynch, supra note 31, at 1698 (“The existing
system of prosecutorial administration has arisen because the traditional adversarial model
50
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unregulated for whatever reasons. Some argue it is better not to artificially
regulate plea bargaining like a contract; the Court has just avoided the
discussion. Thus, although plea bargaining is regarded as “an essential
component”58 in the American adversarial system, it is, ironically, by and
large exempted from the type of formal adversary oversights on which the
American system is generally based.59
B.

Doubts Surrounding the “Accurate” Plea Bargaining Process

The nature of plea bargaining itself, such as whether it implements
adversarial or non-adversarial ideology, or whether it is tightly regulated, is
not at issue in this Article. The question is whether its present practice helps
the courts in their search for the truth or administration of justice.
Ideally, only those who have committed crimes would plead guilty,
and innocent people would walk free. For a period of time, the courts were
convinced that the existing practice of plea bargaining was close to an ideal
status. As the Court pointed out, if plea bargaining is “[p]roperly
administered, it is to be encouraged” because it eliminates many negatives of
a trial, such as time-consuming procedures. 60 However, contrary to the
conventional belief that innocent people do not plead guilty, reliable data on
wrongful convictions clearly reveals that innocent people sometimes do plead
guilty. 61 As of now, more than 380 reported exonerations have reversed
convictions obtained by guilty pleas.62
Determining how problematic the current plea-bargaining practice is
presents a difficult task. Little is known about the real practice of plea
bargaining: for instance, a psychological study that intended to measure the
“accuracy of criminal process” failed to address the guilty-plea issue because
has become too ex-pensive, contentious, and inefficient to be restored, at least given present
levels of criminal conduct and judicial resources.”).
58
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
59
See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 214 (2006) (“Our system has already slipped away from the
adversarial model, and has become instead an ‘administrative system of criminal justice,’
managed by the prosecutor’s office rather than the courts.” (quoting Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998))).
60
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
61
See NAT’L REG. EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
detaillist.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (follow “Browse Cases” drop down; then follow
“Detailed View;” enter “Guilty Plea” into the “Filter” search bar)(reporting that there have
been 380 exonerations in cases in which the conviction was obtained by a guilty plea).
62
Id.
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“it does not readily lend itself to psychological experimentation.” 63 The
concern was that the “defendants’ decisions to plead guilty are [still] based
on sparse, uncertain, and questionable evidence that will rarely be subjected
to any meaningful scrutiny.”64 While plea bargaining gained constitutional
legitimacy after Brady,65 it is still carried out as though it were on the black
market. 66 Accordingly, whether the current plea-bargaining practice induces
accurate outcomes is subject to a recurring controversy.
Given that defendants’ guilty pleas are no longer highly reliable, it is
worth reviewing how and why the plea-bargaining practice rarely concerns
itself with accuracy. For a rough estimate of accuracy, there is one simple and
intuitive factor to consider—the standard of proof. In a trial, the accuracy of
a conviction is guaranteed through a high burden of proof, “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” which the prosecution is obligated to establish.67 However,
in a guilty plea, there is no clear standard like this. One criticism is that “with
mere probable cause, the prosecutor can secure a conviction in almost all
cases.”68 After being charged only on the basis of probable cause, rational
defendants are pressured to plead guilty to avoid trial penalty, even if the
prosecutions’ cases are weak. 69 Thus, Professor Gregory M. Gilchrist
indicates that, in guilty-plea cases, “the effective burden of proof for the
prosecution can be reduced to mere probable cause.”70 If this is true, wrongful
guilty pleas can lead to miscarriages of justice.71
However, in real practice, guilty-plea cases can be disposed of by an
even lower standard than probable cause. Most standards of proof used in
investigation and prosecution tend to be perfunctory. 72 It is difficult to

63

DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 10–13
(2012).
64
Id. at 10.
65
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (approving the constitutionality of plea
bargaining).
66
RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1206 (2d ed. 2005).
67
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
68
Lucian E. Dervan et al., Voices on Innocence, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1589 (2016).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 353 (1986) (discussing that police are not in a neutral
position to enforce probable cause).

112

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

determine whether officers arrest a suspect based on “probable cause”73 or
mere “reasonable suspicion.”74 The same might be true in a prosecutorial
charging decision. 75 This is not because the standards themselves are
ambiguous, 76 but because they are not enforced by neutral and detached
judicial officers; prosecutors are self-regulated. The first judicial stage in
prosecution (and investigation) with any standard of proof is a preliminary
hearing.77 Here, the judge decides whether there is enough evidence to force
the defendant to stand trial based on a “probable cause” standard. However,
for various reasons, defendants often waive the preliminary hearing right and
proceed to trial.78
Although defendants can subsequently file a motion to suppress
evidence, some defendants find this option closed to them. Prosecutors
sometimes make plea offers contingent on the defendants forgoing motions
to suppress evidence. Thus, some defendants do not file a motion simply
because it is too risky and may cost them their opportunity to plea bargain.
Even in other situations, defense counsel often advise defendants that it is in
their best interest to not provoke more tension amongst the court and
prosecutor by waiving their right to raise issues. Putting these strategic
reasons aside, defendants also face structural disadvantages; defendants are
sometimes adversely situated because of the burden of proof for
suppression,79 and hindsight and outcome bias may discourage judges from
suppressing evidence after they see probative evidence that was obtained

73

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1395 (defining “probable cause” as “[a]
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a
place contains specific items connected with a crime”).
74
Id. at 1676 (defining “reasonable suspicion” as “[a] particularized and objective basis,
supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity”).
75
This is because the role of prosecutors is inherently adversarial.
76
See Orin Kerr, Why Courts Should Not Quantify Probable Cause, in THE POLITICAL
HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THE THEMES OF WILLIAM J. STUNTZ 131, 132
(Michael Klarman et al. eds., 2012) (“[The] courts should not quantify probable cause
because quantification would lead to less accurate probable cause determinations.”).
77
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1371 (defining “preliminary hearing” as “[a]
criminal hearing (often conducted by a magistrate) to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to prosecute an accused person”).
78
Paul Bergman, When Does It Make Sense to Waive the Preliminary Hearing?, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-does-sense-waive-the-preliminaryhearing
.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (presenting several reasons why a defendants would waive
their right to a preliminary hearing).
79
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 673.
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illegally.80 In most criminal cases, any applied standard of proof for a guilty
plea to be accepted is, at best, “probable cause” or possibly “reasonable
suspicion.”
While rather cursory, guilty pleas could be disposed of through such
a low threshold. The spate of recent overturned wrongful convictions, arising
from incorrect guilty pleas, have created a strong suspicion about the
reliability of the current plea-bargaining system. This present condition
requires increased attention to the practice of plea bargaining. Although plea
bargaining “is the criminal justice system” 81 in America, more fair and
accurate outcomes are ensured primarily through jury trials.82 As Professor
Stephanos Bibas points out, “[w]e can no longer count on jury trials as
backstops, ensuring that bargains are fair and accurate because bargains are
struck in the shadow of the adversarial process.”83 More troubling is the fact
that much is still unknown about the reality of the plea-bargaining practice
and its effects.84
Despite the growing doubts about the sufficiency of plea bargaining,
the Court has not directly addressed this issue. Instead, as an indirect way to
assure that plea bargains are based on actual guilt, the Court seems to focus
on insufficient information given to defendants during plea negotiations. As
noted, in Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, the Court held that certain types of
information must be given to defendants before they enter guilty pleas and if
such information is not given, IAC claims should be allowed.85 However,
80

For a brief explanation of hindsight and outcome bias, see Barbara O’Brien & Keith
Findley, Psychological Perspectives: Cognition and Decision Making, in EXAMINING
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, MOVING FORWARD 35, 37–38 (Allison D.
Redlich et al. eds., 2014).
81
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
82
STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 13 (2012).
83
Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness
Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1081 (2016).
84
See supra note 59–62 and accompanying text.
85
The Court explained that although defendants have no right to plea bargaining, “[w]hen a
State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must
nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
156, 168 (2012) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985)). This approach means
that the Court intends to indirectly place plea bargaining into the constitutional criminal
procedure rubric, like a right to appeal. Id. (“[C]riminal defendants have a right to effective
assistance of counsel in direct appeals even though the Constitution does not require States
to provide a system of appellate review at all.” (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985))).
Given the increased importance of plea bargaining, injecting constitutional procedural rights
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there are some barriers to cross for such claims. For a right to counsel to be
effective, not only should public defense resources be substantially increased,
but the IAC claim must also be properly asserted as intended, not as an
anomaly.86 This is not an easy obstacle to overcome. Thus, up until now, it
was unclear how recent changes of IAC jurisprudence would contribute to
increasing the accuracy of guilty pleas.
When cases are disposed of by guilty plea, the judicial standard for
accepting the plea seems to be surprisingly low. With the emergence of
numerous wrongful convictions after plea bargaining, the belief that an
innocent person would not plead guilty is no longer certain. Although the
IAC claim in a plea negotiation is now available, its utility is yet unknown.
C.

The Limits of Existing Research

Even though the Court’s expressed interest in plea bargaining is
recent, many scholars have long explored this issue. Various studies—except
for empirical studies with actual data—have been conducted from doctrinal,
historical, 87 comparative, 88 economic, 89 and institutional 90 perspectives.
These studies attempt to address the existing problems of plea bargaining and
suggest a variety of ways to improve it. The studies classify the individual
actors of the judicial system into three categories and proffer remedies for
each: (1) prosecutor—limiting his discretion (power) to balance the playing
field; (2) judge—increasing his role to ensure justice served; and (3) defense
counsel—emphasizing and supporting his role. 91 They could be used as
guidelines for remedying the current inaccuracies of guilty-plea practice.
However, while wide-ranging reforms are necessary (as extensive
research implies), even small changes in plea bargaining could face strong
resistance.92 This is because the American criminal system is already well
therein was predictable to some extent.
86
BIBAS, supra note 82, at xvi (noting that constitutional rights of defendants are mostly used
as mere bargaining chips).
87
See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 2.
88
See, e.g., Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure,
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004); Turner, supra note 59.
89
See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 749 (1983); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988).
90
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 24.
91
This is simply because they are three main actors in the plea-bargaining process.
92
See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
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adapted to the current practice. Given this status quo, identifying where and
how to begin reforms is a difficult decision. That decision requires
determining which reform will be the most realistic, efficient, and most
importantly, powerful. With this critical view in mind, this Article briefly
reviews existing studies in each of the three categories mentioned above.
First, although limiting prosecutorial discretion appears desirable, it
is not easy to implement this kind of proposal. In the United States, most
elected district attorneys exercise wide prosecutorial discretion, based on the
appearance of strong political support. 93 Thus, their discretion is largely
controlled by their political responsibilities, rather than established judiciary
rules.94 In addition, America’s apparent preference for the principle of free
markets supports prosecutors’ extensive discretion.95 This deeply entrenched
ideological principle creates a reluctance to restrain prosecutors’ discretion
to negotiate with defendants. 96 Accordingly, regulating or limiting their
discretion possibly means imposing restrictions on American democracy and
the free market economy.
Moreover, regulating the prosecution’s discretion requires a very
cautious approach, because the criminal justice system is intricately
interconnected. As Frank J. Remington once noted, “an effort to eliminate or
reduce discretion at one stage in the process where it is visible, such as in trial
court sentencing, will create a risk that discretion will merely shift to another
stage where its exercise is less visible, such as the charging and guilty plea
stages.” 97 In a similar vein, if a prosecutor’s discretion is reduced, the
discretion might move to an even more invisible, currently unforeseen, place.
This shows that it is not easy to regulate the discretion of the prosecutor.
Second, to guarantee the accuracy of a guilty plea, the idea of
increasing the judicial role in plea negotiation has been widely discussed.98

93

See DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 16–17 (2016).
94
See id.
95
See id.
96
See id.
97
Frank J. Remington, The Decision to Charge, the Decision to Convict on a Plea of Guilty,
and the Impact of Sentence Structure on Prosecution Practices, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 73, 110 (Lloyd E.
Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993).
98
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Turner, supra note 59.
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However, less attention has been paid to plea colloquy proceedings.99 This
Article argues that reinforcing the judge’s role in plea colloquy bears a greater
examination, not only because Rule 11(c)(1) of the FRCP and precedents
explicitly prohibit judicial participation in plea negotiation,100 but primarily
because increasing the judge’s role in plea negotiation is more difficult and
unlikely than in plea colloquy.
Some argue that increasing judicial participation in plea negotiation
could reduce the abuse of prosecutorial discretion and improve accuracy and
transparency.101 “While all of these concerns [about judicial participation] are
valid,” plea bargaining based on harsh sentencing policy “might coerce an
innocent defendant to plead guilty.” 102 Thus, judicial involvement in plea
negotiation should “promote accuracy and fairness in plea bargaining.”103 A
valid point, yet it seems incompatible with plea-bargaining jurisprudence.
Both democracy and free market ideology encourage parties to negotiate plea
conditions with few constraints. 104 Furthermore, the deeply entrenched
adversarial culture in America has no compunction in promoting agreements
in both civil and criminal cases.105 In this context, plea bargaining is usually
treated more or less as a contract based on both parties’ free will.106 This is
99

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1339 (defining “plea colloquy” as “[a]n
open-court dialogue between the judge and a criminal defendant, [usually] just before the
defendant enters a plea, to establish that the defendant understands the consequences of the
plea”).
100
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (1) (West 2017). Rule 11, in pertinent part, provides:
(c) PLEA AGREEMENT PROCEDURE.
(1) In General. An attorney for the government and the defendant’s
attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss
and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in
these discussions.
Id. (emphasis added).
101
See Turner, supra note 59, at 204.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 214.
104
Infra note 106–12 and accompanying text.
105
Gerard E. Lynch noted:
While some special rules apply to criminal cases, in its essential structure
a criminal case is nothing more than an ordinary lawsuit: the state, like a
private party in a tort or contract action, is just one entity that may come
before the court to present a claim for relief, and the defendant is nothing
more or less than the party from whom that relief is sought.
Lynch, supra note 31, at 1676–77 (emphasis added).
106
See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 551.
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the central problem with increasing judicial involvement in plea negotiations
themselves.
In contrast, reinforcing a judge’s role in a plea colloquy is relatively
acceptable, since the proceeding is administered after the completion of plea
negotiations. Judicial intervention in this stage does not restrict either party’s
discretion to negotiate but partially restrains the scope and available methods
of case disposal. Thus, this approach would be a more appropriate way to
strengthen courts’ involvement in the guilty-plea process. Most judges
usually focus on the defendant’s voluntary wavier of procedural rights in a
plea colloquy,107 and are rarely concerned about the substance of the guilty
plea. 108 Although the reliability of a guilty plea has become increasingly
important, there have been no overt changes to match that increase. 109
Accordingly, increasing the judge’s role in the plea colloquy, particularly on
the substance of the plea agreement, is worth examination as a potential
solution.110
Third, many scholars have consistently highlighted the importance of
the defense counsel’s role in plea bargaining. 111 Placing the defendant on
equal footing with the state in plea bargaining is crucial in the adversarial
setting; thus, the significance of effective assistance of counsel is obvious.
Moreover, given the current status quo of insufficient counsel in criminal
litigation,112 the importance of the defense counsel’s role in plea bargaining
107

See Part II.B.
See Part II.B
109
Turner, supra note 59, at 212 (“At present, the factual basis inquiry into the plea is often
perfunctory.”).
110
This issue is examined in detail in Part III.
111
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2545–47 (2004).
112
Professor Robert A. Kagan states that:
108

Although most (not all) state legislatures have steadily increased
appropriations for public defenders’ offices and assigned criminal defense
counsel, these expenditures have not kept pace with the volume of criminal
cases. . . . Numerous studies have concluded that public defenders, while
hardworking and generally competent, are ‘terribly overburdened.’ . . . [A]
New York City study . . . found that court-appointed defense lawyers filed
written pretrial motions on procedural issues in only 11 percent
nonhomicide felony cases, but even this exceeded the proportion of cases
in which appointed defense lawyers visited the crime site (4 percent),
interviewed witness (4 percent), and used experts to challenge the
prosecution’s evidence (2 percent).
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 94 (2001)
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should already be emphasized. Yet this is not a realistic remedy, as resources
for public defense are inevitably limited. Additionally, because of political
resistance, strong skepticism exists regarding increased funding for public
defenders.113 Thus, Professor Stephanos Bibas claims that it is a better idea
to “set it aside.”114 Accordingly, an alternative solution should be found.
II. A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE: REINVIGORATING THE FACTUAL BASIS
REQUIREMENT
A.

The Factual Basis Requirement: Unnoticed Safeguard

As noted, most of the existing suggestions for improving the current
plea bargain system are somewhat infeasible. Strengthening the court’s role
in plea colloquy is plausible, unless the courts continue to focus only on
confirming procedural guarantees before accepting guilty pleas, rather than
reviewing the substance of plea agreements.115
The courts were not always indifferent to the reliability of plea
bargaining. In 1966, the Supreme Court amended Rule 11 of the FRCP.116
The amendment required a “factual basis” before cases were disposed of by
guilty plea.117 It primarily intended to “impose a duty on the court” to satisfy
itself that “there is a factual basis for the plea before entering judgment.”118
The rule advisory committee’s note explains that this requirement would

(citation omitted).
113
Bibas, supra note 82, at 1070.
114
Id.
115
The Court is primarily concerned with the defendant’s voluntariness of plea,
understanding of charge, understanding of possible consequences, and understanding of the
rights waived, because they are directly relevant to the defendant’s constitutional rights. See
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1248–55.
116
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
117
In Brady, the Court stated in dicta:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the court,
nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall
not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing
the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily
with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea
of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter
a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of
guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 n.3 (1970).
118
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
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protect a defendant who pleads guilty voluntarily, “with an understanding of
the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not
actually fall within the charge.”119 The note further elucidates that the court
should confirm that “the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the
offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included
therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.”120 This change subjected
guilty pleas to “considerable scrutiny,” and it was one of many attempts by
the Warren Court to extend individual rights. 121 The Court noted that the
amended Rule 11 intended to provide “greater guidance to trial judges.”122
This rule remains almost the same today.123
After a few years of revision, the Court showed its willingness to
strictly enforce the new Rule 11 in McCarthy v. United States. 124 The
McCarthy Court emphasized the importance of the factual basis requirement
by noting that, “because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a
formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant

119

Id.
Id.
121
See Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L. REV.
195, 211 (1991).
122
Id. at 212.
123
The current Rule 11, in the pertinent part, provides:
120

(b) CONSIDERING AND ACCEPTING A GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE
PLEA.
(1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the
court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must
address the defendant personally in open court. During
this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and
determine that the defendant understands, the following:
...
(2) Ensuring That a Plea Is Voluntary. Before accepting
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must
address the defendant personally in open court and
determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result
from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in
a plea agreement).
(3) Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea. Before
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
124
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
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possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.”125 The Court
subsequently quoted the Rule 11 Advisory Committee’s note to explain what
the factual basis requirement intended to protect and what judges should do
when determining factual basis.126 Although the primary issue in McCarthy
concerned the judge’s personal inquiry in to whether the defendant
understood the nature of the charge,127 the Court also mandated that a judge
should “scrupulously” follow Rule 11, including the factual basis
requirement.128
Subsequently, the Burger Court reduced the importance of the factual
basis requirement. 129 In North Carolina v. Alford,130 the Court admitted a
new kind of guilty plea, which continues to be a controversial subject.131 The
Court held that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly,
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he
is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the
crime.”132 Despite the fact that the defendant was in fact denying the crime,
the Court did not require the judge to scrutinize a plea agreement more
thoroughly. Professor Albert W. Alschuler noted that the Court made “the
requirement of a factual basis . . . relatively unimportant,” because the Court
“did not specify what kind of hearing a trial court must conduct before
accepting [an Alford] plea . . . .”133 Absent a mandatory hearing, Alschuler
was concerned that most guilty pleas would be accepted, simply because
some evidence gathered during investigation could easily meet the factual
basis requirement.134
This conclusion needs to be examined further: the Alford Court did
not necessarily send a signal. 135 In Alford, the petitioner pled guilty but
125

Id.
Id. at 467 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment).
127
Id. at 463.
128
Id. at 471.
129
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179, 1292–93 (1975); Steven Schmidt, Note, The Need for Review: Allowing
Defendants to Appeal the Factual Basis of a Conviction After Pleading Guilty, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 284, 288–90 (2010).
130
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
131
Id. at 37.
132
Id.
133
Alschuler, supra note 129, at 1292.
134
Id.
135
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1257 (“The [Alford] Court did not state just how
strong this factual basis must be, but it would appear that when a pleading defendant denies
126
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claimed his innocence during plea colloquy in order to avoid a death
penalty. 136 The Court did not reject this practice, because “an express
admission of guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of
criminal penalty.”137 However, the Court emphasized that the validity of an
Alford guilty plea “cannot be seriously questioned,” 138 because the strong
evidence of actual guilt in the record “substantially negated [the defendant’s]
claim of innocence.” 139 It is possible that the jurisprudence of the Alford
Court is largely attributable to the sufficient evidence in the plea records. In
other words, if there had been no strong evidence in the record, it is doubtful
that the Court would have held the plea constitutional. Although the holding
did not specify an evidentiary hearing, the Court also noted that “the
Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences” of a guilty
plea. 140 Accordingly, it is arbitrary to conclude that Alford altered the
importance of factual basis. Instead, the Court provided states with discretion
to accept another form of guilty plea.141
Because of this confused history, the factual basis requirement has
received less attention than it should have. This even may have caused
extreme inconsistencies in interpreting the factual basis requirement among
courts. Professor Jenia I. Turner carefully researched this point by analyzing
federal cases and interviewing legal officials.142 She noted:
One court has defined the [factual basis requirement] as
“sufficient evidence at the time of the plea upon which the
court may reasonably determine that the defendant likely
committed the offense.” Others have simply required “some
factual basis.” Mere admissions of guilt by the defendant are
often sufficient to support a guilty plea. Many courts have
allowed judges to read the indictment to the defendant and
then merely to inquire whether he committed the acts in
the crime the factual basis must be significantly more certain than will suffice in other
circumstances.” (emphasis added)).
136
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970).
137
Id. at 37.
138
Id. at 38.
139
Uncommonly, “[b]efore the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard
the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State’s case. Two other
witnesses besides Alford were also heard.” Id. at 28.
140
Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
141
See Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[The courts] view an Alford
plea as nothing more than a variation of an ordinary guilty plea.”).
142
Turner, supra note 59, at 212–13.
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question. In other courts, the prosecutor's summary of the
evidence or submission of a probable cause affidavit is
enough.143
An astonishing variety of interpretation and application of the factual
basis requirement exists among the federal courts. It seems that each court or
individual judge has its own way. It is not clear whether this is an area where
great flexibility or discretion is particularly required. Instead, it is more
appropriate to note that the Warren Court reform has not been realized as
intended. Particularly noteworthy is that, in some courts, either mere
admission or a probable cause affidavit is sufficient to meet the factual basis
requirement.144 If so, these courts have added nothing after the 1966 revision
of Rule 11 of the FRCP. Thus, some have asserted that, in the American
judicial system, a factual basis requirement is “relatively unimportant”145 and
“more form than substance.”146
The status quo in state courts appears to differ little from the federal
courts. One Indiana trial judge, Earl G. Penrod, surveyed 50 judges (receiving
responses from 36) to learn how Indiana trial court judges understand and
establish the factual basis requirement in plea cases. 147 Penrod noted that,
even among the judges, there was no consensus about what “factual basis”
meant.148 He also found that judges used a variety of methods in handling the
factual basis requirement.149 Penrod concluded that trial judges inconsistently
applied the factual basis requirement and failed to protect defendants’ rights
in the interests of efficiency.150 As a result, he asserted that, “[a]lthough a
143

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
145
Alschuler, supra note 129, at 1293.
146
Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining
Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 930 (1980).
147
See Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the
Diminishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127 (2001).
148
Id. at 1139–42.
149
Penrod states that:
144

Seven judges indicated that the factual basis process is conducted
primarily by the judge, fourteen respondents indicated that the factual basis
procedure is conducted primarily by the prosecutor, seven judges reported
that the factual basis is primarily established by the defense attorney, and
eight respondents advised that the factual basis resulted primarily from the
combined efforts of the judge and the prosecutor.
Id. at 1138.
150
See id. at 1138–43.
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simple, ‘Did you do it?’ may be a bit unrefined, a straightforward inquiry and
an unqualified affirmative response must be part of the record.”151
Faced with these problems, some legal scholars have pointed out the
need to reinvigorate the factual basis requirement in guilty pleas.
Strengthening judicial control in plea colloquy, to prevent weak cases from
being disposed of by guilty plea, is a possible solution.152 Maximo Langer
suggests that the standard of proof in meeting the factual basis requirement
in plea colloquy should be “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and that the
prosecutor should present a sworn affidavit containing a summary of the
evidence to convince the judge.153 Similarly, William J. Stuntz argues that a
judge should carefully review the factual basis during plea colloquy, giving
little deference to a prosecutor’s case. 154 As an example, Stuntz cites the
military court’s practice, which meticulously reviews the factual basis in a
record.155 Both ideas may help guarantee an accurate guilty plea. However,
as both of these ideas are only small parts of Langer’s and Stuntz’s broad
studies, neither author gave any detailed explanation on how to achieve these
goals.156
B.

Ways to Reinvigorate the Factual Basis Requirement

The current disregard of the factual basis requirement is problematic
because the requirement is the only opportunity for substantial judicial review
before the case is disposed of. Given the questionable accuracy of guilty pleas,
151

See id. at 1150.
Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 276–77 (2006).
153
Id.
154
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 302–03 (2011).
155
Id. at 302–03. He states that:
152

Military courts (along with a few state appellate courts) offer a useful
model: they review the factual basis of guilty pleas with great care, and
with little deference to the pleas themselves. That should be the norm
everywhere. Stringent appellate review, with reversal in cases of what the
military calls improvident pleas, would amount to a procedural tax on
pleas. Tax anything and one is likely to see less of it. Plus, military-style
review of guilty pleas would make the pleas that remain more accurate—
a large social gain. Such review would also shift power from prosecutors
to judges, another social gain.
Id. (citation omitted).
156
Langer addresses this topic in only one page of his 77-page article. See Langer, supra note
152, at 276–77. Stuntz also discusses the issue in only one short paragraph in his 413-page
posthumous book. STUNTZ, supra note 154.
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it is difficult to maintain the present perfunctory practice. Reinvigorating the
factual basis requirement will increase the reliability of guilty pleas by
pushing the judge to closely examine the substance of cases.
However, there is an overlooked problem in the process of
establishing the factual basis of guilty pleas. This problem is hidden away in
the 1966 rule advisory committee note, which explains the amended FRCP
Rule 11. The relevant note says that, when determining the factual basis,
“[t]he court should satisfy itself . . . that the conduct which the defendant
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an
offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.” 157
Simply put, the rule states that the court should satisfy itself whether the
defendant’s admitted conduct constitutes the charged offense or not. This
requirement appears to be quite clear and thus could be expected to ensure
the accuracy of a guilty plea: however, this is not the case.
To understand why, we need to first analyze formalism—the legal
reasoning theory that prevailed from the 1870s to the 1920s in the United
States.158 Formalism considers a judge’s role as “simply locating the correct
preexisting rule and applying it to the fact.”159 This legal reasoning assumes
that “the law is rationally determinate,” and “adjudication is thus autonomous
from other kinds of reasoning.” 160 Therefore, the syllogistic reasoning in
formalism can be expressed as follows: “The figure of its reasoning is the
stating of a rule to certain facts, a finding that the facts of the particular case
are those certain facts and the application of the rules a logical necessity.”161
This is based on traditional syllogism (major premise, minor premise, and
conclusion).162 Through this reasoning, formalists usually argue that all cases
could come to only one conclusion. Although this is still an important part of

157

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 6 (Univ. Chi. Pub.
L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 320, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1646110.
159
See Jack L. Landau, Logic for Lawyers, 13 PAC. L.J. 59, 65 (1981).
160
Leiter, supra note 158, at 1 (quotation marks omitted).
161
Landau, supra note 159 (emphasis added) (quoting John M. Zane, German Legal
Philosophy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 287, 338 (1918)).
162
Id. 67–68.
158
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judicial reasoning today, 163 few judges are exclusively dependent on this
reasoning.164
Interestingly, the paraphrased text of the 1966 advisory committee
note and the legal reasoning process in formalism are very similar. Below are
comparisons of each corresponding element between the note and formalistic
reasoning.
1966 Advisory Committee Note
“the charged offense”165
“the defendant’s admitted conduct”167

Formalistic Reasoning
“the stating of a rule to certain facts”166
“a finding that the facts of the particular
case are those certain facts”168
“The court should satisfy itself . . . to “the application of the rule[] [is] a
constitute”169
logical necessity”170

The first row of the 1966 Advisory Committee Note, “the charged offense,”
matches with the first row of the formalistic reasoning, “the stating of a rule
to certain facts.” They both address the applicable rule of each case, which
would be the major premise in syllogism. The second row of the Note, “the
defendant’s admitted conduct,” is very similar to the second row of the
formalistic reasoning, “a finding that the facts of the particular case are those
certain facts.” 171 They deal with the facts of each case, which could be
characterized as the minor premise in the syllogism. The third row of the Note,
“The court should satisfy itself . . . to constitute,”172 is also analogous to the
third row of reasoning, “the application of the rule[] [is] a logical
necessity.”173 Both of these are the conclusions in each case. It is not clear
whether FRCP Rule 11 is in fact promulgated based on this logic. It is fair to

163

See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 583, 585–91 (1993) (discussing formalism as “a theory of legal justification”).
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RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 108 (2013) (“There is no uniform
approach. . . . Most federal court of appeals judge’s cluster in the central portion of the
spectrum, with some leaning toward formalism and others toward realism, but none, or very
few, being all one thing or all the other. Indeed, realism includes formalism as a special
case—formalism is the realistic approach to many cases.”).
165
Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text).
166
Landau, supra note 159.
167
Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text).
168
Landau, supra note 159.
169
Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text).
170
Landau, supra note 159.
171
Id.
172
Supra note 137 (paraphrasing the original text).
173
Landau, supra note 159.
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say, however, that when a judge looks for the factual basis requirement, he
or she is generally following formalistic legal reasoning.
The application of formalism here, however, makes the process of
finding a factual basis virtually meaningless. This is not to say formalism
itself is a problem. 174 Instead, formalism may not work properly in an
environment like a plea colloquy. The first two processes of formalistic legal
reasoning, “the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts” and “a finding that
the facts of the particular case,” require a judge's active recognition and
interpretation.175 Thus, these processes should involve actively going back
and forth between laws and facts. However, in a plea colloquy, this process
may be transformed into the cursory syllogistic process, because pleading
guilty is presumed to include both the defendant’s voluntary admission to his
conduct (i.e., “a finding that the facts of the particular case”) and charged
offense (i.e., “the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts”). 176 This
admission is likely to oversimplify the formalistic reasoning process, because
the judge would rely on the defendant’s admissions and omit his own active
recognition and interpretation process. More likely than not, many judges
would not struggle to deviate from this shortcut and may not feel the need for
additional argument. Thus, the factual basis requirement is doomed to be
structurally neglected.
This problem requires a different approach. The 1966 advisory note
says “[t]he court should satisfy itself . . . that the conduct which the defendant
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an
offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.”177 In the
Oxford Dictionaries, the definition of “satisfy” is to “[p]rovide (someone)
with adequate information or proof so that they are convinced about
something.”178 If this definition is applied to construe the Note, then a judge
174

For criticism of formalism, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
See Leiter, supra note 158, at 2 (“[Formalistic] legal reasoning is not mechanical, that it
demands the identification of valid sources of law, the interpretation of those sources, the
distinguishing of sources that are relevant and irrelevant, and so on, and they offer a
theoretical account of how these various bits of reasoning are done ‘rightly.’” (emphasis
added)).
176
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Central to the plea and the foundation
for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court that
he committed the acts charged in the indictment.”).
177
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (emphasis added).
178
Satisfy, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition
/american_ english/satisfy (last visited Jan. 27, 2018). Of the five meanings of “satisfy”
175
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must provide himself with adequate information or proof, so that he is
convinced to the standard criticized above.
In interpreting the 1966 Advisory Note, if one put an emphasis on the
word proof, it would no longer allow the judge to rely on the above cursory
syllogistic process. This approach may induce judges to establish the factual
basis requirement under the standard of proof rubric, which will lead judges
to assume a greater responsibility in plea colloquy. 179 Instead of simply
relying on the defendant’s voluntary admission, the judge must personally
find the rule of “the charged offense” and the fact of “the defendant’s
admitted conduct.” 180 Formalistic legal reasoning would then work more
properly.
Given that standards of proof in charging decisions and in prior
judicial proceedings are rather perfunctory,181 the standard of proof for the
factual basis requirement should be at least “preponderance of evidence,”182
or preferably “clear and convincing evidence.”183 This suggestion needs no
revision of Rule 11 of the FRCP; a new interpretation is all that is needed.
Interestingly, some courts have already adopted this approach. In an earlier
case, after the revision of Rule 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit recognized that the factual basis requirement could be used as
guidance for judges to find the probability of conviction for a guilty plea.184
Other state courts have similarly noted that the factual basis requirement is

included, this one is the most analogous to the usage in the advisory note.
179
See Note, The Trial Judge’s Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966
WASH. U. L. Q. 306, 320 (1966) (finding a factual basis, “[i]f no specific burden is
established, the amount of evidence needed will be dependent upon the diligence of the trial
judge”).
180
See supra note 169–74 & accompanying text.
181
See Part II.B.
182
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1373 (defining “preponderance of
evidence” as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater
number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force”
or “superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue
rather than the other”).
183
Id. at 674 (defining “clear and convincing evidence” as “[e]vidence indicating that the
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain”).
184
The court noted that the factual basis requirement in Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P. is
“consistent with a probability-of-guilt standard, . . . [t]he committee’s purpose was that the
court itself be satisfied of the factual basis for the plea, rather than rely exclusively on
defendant and his counsel.” Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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met when the record contains “enough that the court may say with confidence
the prosecution could prove the accused guilty of the crime charged.”185
It might be argued that no standard of proof really functions properly,
given the inherent ambiguity in interpreting each standard. 186 Empirical
studies have shown the lay persons’ inconsistency in applying the standard
of proof.187 Although these results are not directly applicable to professional
judges, it is not clear whether the newly established standard will make much
difference. However, from pretrial proceeding to post-conviction relief,
judicial proceedings inevitably rely on a judge’s decisions, based on
numerous standards of proof.188 Accordingly, a primary concern should not
be the ambiguity of any standards, but rather the absence of a standard of
review in guilty pleas. At the very least, this Article’s suggestion would
prevent those cases that only meet a “probable cause” (or merely a “beyond
a reasonable suspicion”) standard.
The idea of reinvigorating the factual basis requirement has several
additional benefits. First, changes initiated by judicial officers are more
realistic. As noted, existing proposals to regulate prosecutors or to increase
defense resources face virtually insurmountable obstacles.189 In contrast, the
judiciary is relatively well positioned to lead changes, considering its
professional knowledge and political support. This judicial-based suggestion
may not be the most desirable option, but it could be feasible enough to break
up the standoff in guilty pleas.
In addition, the increased responsibility for a judge to find a factual
basis could positively impact prosecution. Prosecutors often do not carefully
develop case files because of the expectation of reaching a plea agreement.190
Even in weak cases, many defendants plead guilty, as almost all cases are
disposed of by guilty pleas.191 Thus, current practices still involve the risk of
185

Jones v. State, 936 So.2d 993, 999 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Corley v. State, 585
So. 2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1991)).
186
See SIMON, supra note 63, at 195–97.
187
See Id. at 195–96 (discussing empirical research about lay persons’ understanding of the
standard of proof).
188
For instance, the “probable cause” standard is used during preliminary hearings, and
various standards are also used at the appellate level.
189
See supra note 130–31 and accompanying text.
190
See Part IV.B.
191
Many scholars have discussed the problem of plea bargaining a case with weak evidence.
See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner, Prosecutors and Bargaining in Weak Cases, in THE PROSECUTOR
IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 102, 102–06 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012).

2018

CONVICTION BEYOND A REASONABLE SUSPICION

129

convicting innocents. 192 Reinvigorating the factual basis requirement will
induce prosecutors to develop the weaker cases to meet the specific standard
of proof for pleas.193 By doing this, prosecutors would have stronger case
files or could discover previously unknown exculpatory evidence. Both are
good results and strengthen the dependability and accuracy of the system.
Likewise, strengthening the factual basis requirement will bring a
positive effect to present pre-plea discovery practice. In some jurisdictions,
the scope of pre-plea discovery is very narrow 194 because, as Professor
Turner noted, “the Supreme Court has never held that the prosecution’s
evidence must be disclosed to the defendant before a guilty plea.”195 However,
if the judge has a new obligation, this narrow practice could be changed. With
an increased responsibility to find factual basis, judges will want to see more
evidence prior to plea colloquy, and prosecutors will be obliged to disclose
more evidence. These increased responsibilities of both judge and prosecutor
will extend the scope of discovery before plea colloquy. This Article’s
suggestion would lead to broad discovery (ideally open file discovery),196
which would help participants in criminal proceedings make more informed
decisions.197
C.

How It Would Work

However, even if the necessity and premise for strengthening the
factual basis requirement is recognized, a smooth transition is not guaranteed.
192

Id. at 105.
Of course, the resource problem also applies to the prosecution. Part IV.B addresses this
issue in detail.
194
See Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 313–16 (discussing the preplea discovery practice between an “open-file” model (North Carolina) and a “closed-file”
model (Virginia)).
195
Id. at 287 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 (2002)) (emphasis added).
196
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, 1263 (defining “open-file discovery” as “[a]
case-specific policy in which prosecutors allow defense counsel to see (but not always to
obtain copies of) all the documents in their file relating to the defendant”).
197
Some criminal justice officials are still skeptical about open file policy because they
consider that the Brady rule is sufficient to protect defendants’ rights. See Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 86(1963) (noting that prosecutors have to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence before trial). They also note that, in practice, broader discovery than required
by law is already provided by many prosecutors. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 194.
However, Professor Jenia I. Turner, in her study of comparing open file practice (North
Carolina) with closed file discovery practice (Virginia), empirically shows that the former
actually provides more material and exculpatory evidence to defendants and makes the guilty
plea process more efficient. See id.
193
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American lawyers are already accustomed to the present guilty-plea practice
and may not be familiar with placing the additional burden on the judge in a
plea-colloquy stage. 198 Moreover, “[m]any judges seem to believe that
prosecutors know more about specific cases than they do,” and thus “exercise
a ‘light touch’ when it comes to their oversight of guilty pleas.” 199 They
simply note that there is not much evidence presented during plea colloquy.200
It is thus necessary to overcome these conventions for this proposal’s
potential to be realized, and steps must be taken to guide this process.
First, the appropriate role of the judge in plea colloquy should be
clarified. In jury trials, a judge acts as a gate keeper who addresses evidentiary
matters; the judge’s important role is to decide the appropriate evidentiary
issues to protect the jury from developing biases or prejudice.201 However, a
plea colloquy is somewhat different from a jury trial. In a plea-colloquy
proceeding, judges are obligated to find a factual basis before accepting a
guilty plea; here, the judge operates as a fact-finder.202 If a judge fails to reach
a certain standard of proof in forming a factual basis—after a thorough review
of materials and hearing statements—the judge can also directly request
additional information. A plea judge does not need to remain passive. Like
the judges’ role in either a detention hearing 203 or a warrant judgment
proceeding, where judges are expected to lead the proceeding and give a
decision based on a clear standard, in plea hearings, judges can and should
play a more important role.
Critics may point out that even active judges are not well-equipped to
find a concrete factual basis in plea colloquy. This view is based on a
traditional belief that facts are mostly found in trial, where most of the
evidence is presented.204 Appellate courts’ “extreme deference” to trial courts’
fact finding is based on this conventional belief. American lawyers assume
that the fact-finding ability of appellate courts is significantly limited,
198

See Part IV.A.
Richard L. Lippke, Reforming Plea Bargaining, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL
LAW 173, 177 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., 2016).
200
See id.
201
FED. R. EVID. 103(c); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
(establishing the “gatekeeping role for the judge”).
202
See Part III.A.
203
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 836 (defining “detention hearing” as “[a]
hearing to determine whether an accused should be released pending trial”).
204
Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591,
619 (2009).
199
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because not much evidence is presented.205 However, this Article’s proposal
could extend the scope of the evidence presented before or during the plea
colloquy. This is because greater responsibilities on the judge and the
prosecutor are expected to broaden the range of pre-plea discovery.206
Even without this change, judicial fact finding in plea colloquy is not
necessarily impossible. A plea-colloquy stage is still open to minimum fact
finding, as appellate courts reviewing “cold record”207 also have some leeway.
The institutional competence of appellate courts in fact finding is due to a
number of factors:208 (1) the advantages of carefully reviewing a transcript;
(2) the absence of misleading witness demeanor; (3) the advantage of
professional judges’ experience; and (4) the equal condition in reviewing
circumstantial and documentary evidence with the trial court.209 Simply put,
the appellate courts have their own means of finding facts. Plea judges could
enjoy all or some of those means.
Plea judges can find facts by thoroughly reviewing materials,
including plea agreements, complaints, and police reports.210 Although these
materials might not be as substantial or comprehensive as a trial transcript,
they nonetheless convey the minimum “logical and abstract operations.”211
Plea judges are usually not at risk of being misled by the demeanor of
witnesses and could use discretion in plea colloquy.212 If circumstantial and
documentary evidence are presented, judges are on an equal footing with any
fact finders. Moreover, there are no barriers for active judges to ask additional
questions or to require the prosecution to submit other evidence if some
doubts still exist. 213 Overall, it is entirely possible to have fact-finding
activity during a plea colloquy.
This Article’s proposal would induce the judge to undertake a more
active role, deviating from the currently passive practice—meaningless
205

Id. at 602. Professor Chad M. Oldfather simply noted that fact finders in trial “can assess
not only what a witness says, but also how she says it.” Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts,
Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 445 (2004).
206
See infra note 234–37 and accompanying text.
207
This phrase means “the transcripts of testimony and the documentary and physical
exhibits introduced at trial.” Findley, supra note 204, at 619.
208
Oldfather, supra note 205, at 449–50.
209
Id. at 451–66.
210
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
211
Oldfather, supra note 205, at 456.
212
See infra note 250–52 & accompanying text.
213
No rule in FRCP prohibits this kind of request from the judge.
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formalistic syllogism. For instance, a judge would adhere to the following
steps to satisfy his reinvigorated responsibility: (1) before entering the
courtroom, the judge would thoroughly read the relevant materials, including
a complaint and a police report, to identify facts and issues of the case (in the
present stage, the judge may enter the courtroom without thorough
knowledge); (2) the judge would hear more detailed facts of the case from
the prosecutor, defense attorney, and defendant (at present, the judge is not
obligated to listen to the specific facts other than the guilty plea); (3) the judge
would require a brief description of the type and content of evidence held by
the prosecutor 214 (at present, the judge does not need to review all of the
evidence that the prosecution has); (4) the judge would ask for more detailed
information of evidence, if he or she is still not satisfied with the standard of
proof (this rarely occurs today); (5) the judge would require the prosecution
to submit the additional evidence (again, at present, this rarely occurs); (6)
the judge would request the sentencing report, postponing the acceptance of
guilty plea (once again, this rarely occurs).215
The stages illustrated above are all things that a judge could do in plea
colloquy. Indeed, there would no obligation for the judge to meet all the steps,
if only some prove sufficient in a given case. Depending on different
situations, the judge will selectively act to meet the burden of proof. As the
proposed burden of proof (preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing
evidence) in this Article is not overly high, significant changes to practice are
not expected.
The following reforms would support an establishment of the factual
basis requirement. First, preparing a plea agreement should involve more
sophisticated practice than most states currently require. In this regard, a
comparison of federal and state plea agreements provides some insights.
Federal prosecution produces a lengthy document containing comprehensive
rules and consequences of accepting a plea agreement.216 It usually includes
214

This situation is similar with Professor Maximo Langer’s suggestion. See Langer, supra
note 152, at 276–77.
215
This is already available under the current rule of criminal procedure. “To the extent the
plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.”
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (3)(A).
216
Plea Agreement, U. S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/ag/plea-agreeme
nt (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (displaying a plea agreement form used in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia).
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detailed fact patterns in guilty pleas: states use less elaborate practices.217 For
instance, Wisconsin prosecutors usually produce a short document that
outlines a checklist to waive one’s constitutional rights. 218 The process is
often improvised with defendants sitting outside a courtroom, shortly before
a plea colloquy. 219 Under this practice, it is questionable whether state
prosecutors critically review police reports and other evidence to convey
factual basis. The judge’s critical review of the factual basis requirement is
just as limited. The best practice, similar to the federal practice, would not
only assist judges in finding a factual basis but would also force prosecutors
to thoroughly examine their files.
Second, there needs to be consistency in allowing appeals based on
the lack of a factual basis. For example, some federal appellate courts allow
appeals based on a lack of a factual basis after defendants plead guilty, but
this is not always the case.220 Moreover, there is an inconsistency even within
circuits in allowing defendants to appeal.221 Among the circuits that allow
appeals under a less strict standard, the standard itself is not clear.222 Various
standards, including “de novo,” “abuse of discretion,” “clearly erroneous,”
and “plain error” standards, are used when appellate courts evaluate claims
of an inadequate factual basis.223 These variances fail to protect a defendant
to differing degrees, depending on the jurisdiction in which the defendant is
charged. Strengthening the factual basis requirement will only become
possible when these circuit splits are resolved.
Reforming plea bargaining practice will take enormous effort. Given
the predominance of plea bargaining in its current practice, even a small
change could raise political, institutional, and cultural resistance.224 It is thus
217

See, e.g., State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court, Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights,
https://www.wicourts.gov/forms/CR-227.PDF (last visited Jan. 27, 2018)
(displaying a plea agreement form used in the circuit court in the State of Wisconsin); Plea
Agreement, ST. FLA., http://flcourts18.org/docs/sem/Felony_Plea_Agreement_1_06_SC18_
Rev.5-15-14-Eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
218
See State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court, Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights,
WICOURTS.GOV, https://www. wicourts.gov/forms/CR-227.PDF (last visited Jan. 27, 2018)
(displaying a plea agreement form used in the circuit court in the State of Wisconsin).
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This is the author’s own experience during judicial internship in Dane County Courthouse
in Wisconsin.
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Schmidt, supra note 129, at 313–14.
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Id.
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Id. at 295–96.
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Id.
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Packer, supra note 36, at 47 (“It is widely asserted that any significant increase in the
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important to review the resistances that these proposals might bring and
address the concerns about them.
III. REFUTING ANTICIPATED COUNTERARGUMENTS
A.

Concerns for Inertia of Adversary Philosophy

In the current state of affairs, lawyers are accustomed to the
adversarial culture, and judges operate as neutral and passive fact-finders.225
Even a slight or narrowed judicial intervention might prove to be impossible.
Professor William T. Pizzi pointed out that this adversarial obsession arose
from American lawyers’ misunderstanding of other countries’ legal systems
and blind faith in the American legal system.226 “As practitioners, they may
be quite excellent at what they do but as law reformers they are timid and
unimaginative.”227 It might be difficult to overcome this established standard,
even though the trial judges’ authority in plea colloquy is grounded in
existing procedure.
This deep inertia also shapes the direction of reforms in the legal
system. Despite the Innocence Movement, the past three decades have
witnessed only minimal change in the adversarial system. 228 Legal
number of criminal prosecutions going to trial would result in a breakdown of the criminal
justice system.”).
225
See Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714–15 (1983).
226
See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT 90–91
(1999). Professor Pizzi states that:
When it comes to what I have been referring to in this book as
“continental” or “European” countries, such as Germany, France, or the
Netherlands, American lawyers know next to nothing. Sometimes what
they think they “know” is worse than knowing nothing. You will
occasionally hear leading members of the bar saying things about other
western countries—for example, that “in country X the defendant is
assumed guilty and must prove he is innocent” or that “in country Y the
defendant is not given a trial”—which are untrue for those countries. The
tone of such pronouncements usually implies that our trial system is clearly
superior to any other, that our lawyers and judges have it all pretty much
figured out, and that we have little to learn from other legal systems.
Id.
227

Id. at 91. Pizzi points out that American law schools’ inadequate education with respect
to other countries’ legal systems makes creative reforms unimaginable. Id.
228
See Marvin Zalman & Ralph Grunewald, Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence
Revolution and Proposals to Modify the American Criminal Trial, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 189
(2015).
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scholarship has mainly focused on the specific causes of wrongful conviction
(such as eyewitness misidentification, false confession, and jailhouse
snitches), the legal profession (prosecutorial and police misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel), and psychological effect of legal actors
(e.g., tunnel vision). 229 In contrast, scholarship that addresses the trial or
pretrial processes has been “comparatively sparse.”230 The “adversary trial
does not appear on any canonical list of wrongful conviction causes,”231 but
“lawyers’ ideology may have blinded them from seeing the trial system itself
as a source of error, or changing the adversary trial process may have seemed
too theoretical and remote.”232 Not only are few judges willing to be more
active in plea colloquy, but both parties could also be resistant to judicial
intervention.
The American adversarial culture views a neutral and passive fact
finder as a symbol that should not be infringed. 233 Professor Stephan
Landsman mentioned two understandable ideas underlying this preference.
He first noted that an “[a]dversary theory suggests that if the decision maker
strays from the passive role, he risks prematurely committing himself to one
version of the facts and failing to appreciate the value of all the evidence.”234
This suggests that the adversary theory finds that neutrality and passivity
“convince society that the judicial system is trustworthy.”235 Similarly, Chief
Justice John Roberts once revealed his judicial philosophy in his confirmation
hearing by describing the role of a judge as limited to that of an umpire,
calling balls and strikes, and not of a player, pitching or batting.236
The primary concern is that many trial judges do not even perform
their minimal roles as final arbiters. Incorporating Justice Roberts’ analogy,
it is true that roles of baseball umpires are limited to calling balls and strikes.
But they carefully observe the ball’s location with keen eyes and deliberately
call balls or strikes during a game. However, it seems that plea judges do not
even care so much about the ball’s location—about the substance of a case
229

Id. at 190–91.
Id.
231
Id. at 191.
232
Id. at 192.
233
See Landsman, supra note 225, at 715.
234
Id.
235
Id.
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Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005).
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and whether factual basis exists. Their eyes only follow the players to find
out whether they properly follow the rules and wear protective equipment—
whether defendants appropriately waive their constitutional rights. This
baseball analogy may exaggerate the similarities and differences between
umpires and judges. Nevertheless, most plea judges arguably consider their
roles as merely accepting mutual agreements on the condition that the process
is appropriate. The American trial judge’s role as final arbiter has become
extremely weak and passive.
This deeply entrenched philosophy is the main barrier for this
Article’s proposal to be realized. When there is no marked dispute between
two parties, judges who are not familiar with the facts of the case may not
know what actions to take. One who agrees with the baseball umpire analogy
would still dislike more strengthened review for the factual basis in plea
colloquy. However, the difficulty of realization does not mean that it is
impossible. This proposal does not come from nowhere and in fact fits with
existing scholarly efforts that seek to heighten the role of judges. The idea of
judicial participation in plea negotiation is one of these existing efforts.237
These efforts are also reflected in the urge to increase reviews of problematic
evidence.238 The attempt to broaden factual review in the appellate process
similarly demands a greater judicial role than the present process. 239
Altogether, these efforts will help to overcome the inertia of legal
professionals. Momentum generated by those reforms will pave the way for
this Article’s proposal.
The ways in which plea bargaining has been introduced in European
countries provide some lessons to the American plea-bargaining system. At
first, the introduction of plea bargaining in Europe faced serious criticism,
because it contradicts the fundamental idea of the inquisitorial system: that
the state should pursue the truth, not agreement. 240 Conversely, European
countries did not implement American-style plea bargaining; they modified
237

See Turner, supra note 59.
See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and
Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723 (2013) (discussing judicial
gatekeeping about suspect evidence).
239
Findley, supra note 204, at 623 (“Appellate judges can then use that training—that
acquired institutional advantage—to engage in more meaningful factual review of cases
involving that kind of evidence.” (citing George C. Thomas III, Bigotry, Jury Failures, and
the Supreme Court’s Feeble Response, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 947, 973 (2007))).
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See Langer, supra note 88, at 3–4.
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the original plea bargaining to be compatible with their systems.241 Greater
judicial control of plea bargaining in European countries helps remedy many
of the problems in the American system. 242 For example, the sentencing
disparity between trial and guilty plea is less dramatic in Germany than in
America.243 American legal professionals should recognize that there is no
single, eternal plea-bargaining practice. As some already urge modifications
of the American plea-bargaining system based on comparative study,244 it is
worth considering taking a different angle, to move into at least a slightly
different direction.
B.

Concerns about Resources

Strong concerns about resources are another tough obstacle to this
Article’s proposal. Many legal professionals consistently raise this issue by
noting the crowded dockets of trial courts and limited government
personnel.245 In fact, this was the primary concern when the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution does not require impeachment information to be
disclosed to the defendant before the guilty-plea stage.246 In United States v.
Ruiz,247 the Court expressly held that mandatory disclosure of impeachment
evidence “could require the Government to devote substantially more

241

See Id. at 3 (“[T]he importation of plea bargaining into these jurisdictions is not likely to
reproduce an American model of criminal procedure. Each of these jurisdictions has adopted
a form of plea bargaining that contains differences—even substantial differences—from the
American model, either because of decisions by the legal reformers in each jurisdiction or
because of structural differences between American criminal procedure and the criminal
procedures of the civil law tradition.”).
242
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, American Criminal Procedure in a European Context, 21 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 453–54 (2013) (elaborating that in European countries, the “judicial
monitoring guarantees the fairness of the deal and should avoid some of the problems related
to U.S. plea bargaining; particularly, the lack of legal counsel and the pressure imposed by
prosecutors so that the accused accepts the guilty plea”).
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Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American
Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 354
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encourage initial over-charging, or to create undue risks of convicting the innocent.”).
244
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 191, at 115 (“[The German] system seem[s] to do a better
job of avoiding plea bargains that are not based on the facts and impose unacceptable risks
of coercing innocent defendants to plead guilty. . . . [It] may serve useful model for American
reformers interested in curbing the dangers associated with plea bargaining in cases where
the evidence is weak.”).
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See Easterbrook, supra note 26, at 552.
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United States. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629–32 (2002).
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resources to trial preparation prior to plea bargaining, thereby depriving the
plea-bargaining process of its main resource-saving advantages.” 248
Particularly, the Court noted that “the added burden imposed upon the
Government by requiring its provision well in advance of trial (often before
trial preparation begins) can be serious.”249
This kind of concern is reasonable. Anyone who visits any county
trial court for the first time would be surprised by its long list of plea-hearing
cases scheduled in a single day; the time cycles of trial judges and prosecutors
are frenetic. It is plausible to argue that this Article’s suggestion, to require a
judge to be convinced beyond a certain burden of proof in finding a factual
basis requirement, would disrupt the current balance of the plea-bargaining
process.
However, there is no reason to treat all cases the same. Exonerations
often receive national headlines largely because they were felony offenses
involving long-term incarcerations. Thus, as Professor Alexandra Natapoff
noted, although wrongful convictions in misdemeanors are also
problematic,250 it would not be unreasonable to focus first on felony cases.
To handle felony cases more carefully is also justifiable from a constitutional
perspective. The Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial for “serious”
offenses,251 and a right to appointed counsel in limited cases.252 The same
could apply to the factual basis requirement. California already does not
require factual basis for a guilty plea to a misdemeanor offense.253 Similarly,
the Supreme Court also flexibly responded to this factual basis requirement
in the past. In Libretti v. United States, the Court held that a factual basis
under Rule 11 of the FRCP is not necessarily required for a stipulated asset,
because forfeiture is not part of a conviction.254
248

Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
250
See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1059 (2015).
251
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for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is
authorized.”).
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E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel
applies to all cases where imprisonment is a possibility); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 339–40 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel applies to all criminal cases).
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Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38–39 (1995). However, this holding is at risk of
reversal after Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because “Apprendi eschews the
distinction between sentencing factors and elements of a crime.” United States v. Buckland,
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There is, in fact, an existing way to confirm factual basis without
consuming extra resources. The 1966 advisory note on Rule 11 gave
additional leeway to establish factual basis “by examining the presentence
report.” 255 Using a presentence report in a guilty-plea process would not
substantially increase the resource demand, because the report is already
scheduled to be prepared for sentencing hearings. Reviewing them in plea
colloquy just means consuming the investigation resource a few months
earlier. In addition, judges are free to employ these materials because the
Rules of Evidence are not applied during plea colloquy.256
Lastly, strengthening a judge’s role in a guilty-plea process could also
bring a positive change to legal culture and practice. It is well known that the
preference for a jury trial is largely based on concerns of the overreaching
power of the judicial branch.257 Thus, a judgment by peers, apparently more
democratic, holds a dominant position in the American trial system; bench
trials are relatively rare.258 If a trial judge shows his or her willingness to
evaluate the substance of cases with a distinct suspicion, this would reduce
prejudice against the judiciary and induce some defendants to choose a bench
trial as an alternative. Bench trials are generally more informal and shorter,
which saves judicial and prosecutorial resources, thus dealing with this major
concern.259
C.

Concerns for Losing Benefits for Defendants

The third potential problem is that defendants could lose benefits if
the courts more rigorously examine plea agreements and accept them only
under more stringent standards. Indeed, defendants have enjoyed benefits
because of plea bargaining, as the court now accepts plea agreements quickly
and on a generous basis. The primary benefit is that defendants can avoid a

289 F.3d 558, 566 (9th Cir. 2002); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 174 (4th ed. 2017).
255
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
256
See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 254.
257
See Langbein, supra note 2, at 269 (“In America, where the judiciary’s association with
the excess of English colonial administration had led the framers to make jury trial a
constitutional right, bench trial was all the harder to envision.”).
258
Id. at 269.
259
Although it is possible to say that a jury trial is sometimes faster, and a bench trial takes
more time to reach a decision, see Prentice H. Marshall, A View from the Bench: Practical
Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 156 (1990), few might argue that a bench
trial in fact consumes more resources.
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harsh sentence under the current severe punishment policies. 260 Even if
defendants can assert innocence because the evidence from prosecution is
weak, going to trial can be a dangerous gamble under the severe sentencing
policies as they are now. Plea agreements also usually have much shorter
sentences.261 In addition, some defendants, for various reasons, wish to be
released earlier from criminal procedure by pleading guilty.262 By waiving a
right to a public trial, they may avoid humiliation before known or unknown
persons.263 Or they might wish to protect victims from being embarrassed if
intimate relationships exist. Thus, the current plea-bargaining practice is part
of a spontaneous output of current criminal justice policy and defendants’
interests.
However, the introduction of more stringent judicial review of the
factual basis does not mean that all the current benefits enjoyed by the
defendant will disappear. One reason for imposing harsh punishment on
defendants who do not plead guilty is that not-guilty pleas lead to the
consumption of more government resources. 264 In contrast, this proposal
claims that it is the judge, not the defendant, who decides to go to trial when
260

See Lippke, supra note 199, at 175–78 (noting that “[t]he magnitude of the sentencing
concessions” and “[t]he existence of trial penalties” are principle reasons of distinctive “trial
avoidance” in America).
261
See Id. at 175 (“Though estimates vary, it seems clear that such sentencing concessions
can exceed 50 percent of the statutorily available sentence[.]”).
262
See Id. at 177 (“[P]retrial detention, numerous required court hearings, delays in the onset
of trials, the public embarrassment involved in having to appear and answer to charges,
foregone earnings from work, and stress on familial and other social relations.”).
263
See Id.
264
See Id. at 176. Professor Lippke explains:
Criminal defendants who refuse to enter guilty pleas, but who instead go
to trial and are convicted, are very unlikely to receive the sentence or
charge concessions on offer from prosecutors pretrial, assuming that
prosecutors saw fit to offer any. Such concessions were proffered as
rewards for guilty pleas. But do persons convicted after trials suffer more
than the loss of such “waiver rewards”? Many observers believe that they
do, that prosecutors often recommend longer sentences than they might
have initially deemed appropriate or fair, given the nature of the
accusations against persons, simply to punish the convicted for having
exercised the right to trial. These vindictively-motivated sentence add-ons
are “trial penalties.” Not only can they be substantial, but judges might
also go along with them. Judges likewise do not appear to appreciate
exercise of the right to trial by many criminal defendants. Assuming they
exist, trial penalties swell sentencing differentials.
Id. (citation omitted).
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a prosecution’s file lacks an adequate factual basis. Therefore, at the
sentencing hearing, the judge would not consider a trial as an aggravating
sentencing factor. Thus, defendants would not need to fear a “trial
penalty.”265
Moreover, this Article does not argue that every case failing to meet
a certain standard should be dismissed. This means that, if the evidence shows
that defendants obviously receive benefits from a guilty plea, then the judge
could be allowed to accept the guilty plea, whether in charge bargaining266 or
sentence bargaining.267 Charge bargaining might involve a guilty plea to a
day offense, even though the factual basis supports a night offense.268 If so,
the judge would have a difficult time finding a factual basis when “the offense
to which the plea is made is not a logical[ly] included offense of the crime
committed.”269 Sentence bargaining might include a sudden decrease in the
amounts of drugs that is seized and already tested in forensic laboratory.
However, in those cases, defendants obviously benefit from plea bargaining.
Only when there is a significant lack of factual basis as to raise a concern
about convicting the innocent, should judges actively establish the factual
basis and be deliberate in admitting guilty pleas.
Yet even if all of the criticisms and concerns discussed are irrefutable
and unresolvable, plea bargaining itself is not a constitutional right, unlike
the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.270 In other words,
rejecting a disposal by guilty plea will not itself harm the defendant from a
constitutional perspective.271
CONCLUSION
Because the concern of wrongful guilty pleas has increased, the
accuracy and reliability of plea agreements must be carefully addressed.
Nonetheless, in practice, plea bargaining is now substantially being accepted
265
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267
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269
Id.
270
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
271
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under very low standards of proof. This Article addresses the issues of judges
being unconcerned with or inconsistent in the practice of guiding the stages
of guilty plea. The Article further suggests that a judge should carefully
review the factual basis to avoid a wrongful guilty plea. Although Rule 11(b)
of the FRCP requires judges to check the factual basis of guilty pleas, the rule
is not given much attention by legal professionals. This shows that the rule
itself has a structural problem, which causes judges to improperly enforce it
during plea colloquy. Instead of revising the rule, this Article proposes a new
interpretation, which will induce judges to confirm the factual bases for such
pleas. This practical solution presents a number of advantages: (1) filtering
out inaccurate and unreliable guilty pleas, (2) increasing the accountability of
the prosecution in guilty pleas, and (3) helping defendants make more
informed plea decisions. Some of the concerns associated with the proposal
of this Article can be overcome (concerns for inertial of adversary
philosophy 272 ), reasonably managed (concerns about resources 273 ), or
understood that they are, in fact, rather exaggerated (concerns for losing
profits of defendants274). This Article provides the blueprint for a new, better
future for all those involved in plea bargaining in America.
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